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Abstract. This article investigates the use of natural law in biolaw from the specific 
perspective of an attorney practising before the European Court of Human Rights. Starting 
from an exploration of the question of who is a human and thereby to be protected under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particular emphasis is placed on the right 
to life under Art. 2(1) ECHR. It is shown that natural law can – and should – impact the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and that concrete consequences 
follow from this approach, most notably the requirement to ensure that every human being, 
including the unborn, is actively protected as concerns the right to life.
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Introduction
Biolaw is concerned inter alia with the rights of a human person in the context of 
medical and scientific procedures. As such, it is connected to other fields of law, most 
notably human rights law. Biolaw has to contribute to facilitating medical and scientific 
progress while safeguarding the rights of humans and protecting other life. Finding a 
working balance between progress and protection becomes increasingly difficult when 
the potential benefits appear great and those who are put in harm’s way are unable to 
speak for themselves. In an age of relativism, when the lines between the right and 
wrong seem to be blurred and when the law can no longer provide a yardstick for what 
is morally correct, Natural Law, which has regained some importance after the horrors 
of the Shoa and World War II, can provide guidance. This is particularly true when it 
comes to the treatment of the human person in the context of science and medicine. 
This article is built on the premise that the personal scope of the right to life under 
Art. 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights2 is to be understood so as to 
include all human beings regardless of their development, age, health or handicap, in 
particular the unborn human child.3
Not only is consensus hardly a relevant – or even a useful – category when 
interpreting human rights (after all, in a democracy human rights are also meant to 
protect the minority against the ruling majority), the wide-ranging diversity of legislation 
in the almost fifty states to which the Convention applies makes it virtually impossible 
to find much in way of a consensus on key bioethical issues, such as abortion, in one 
way or the other.
1. Who is Human?
While it appears obvious to everybody, whether someone (or something?) is alive, 
things become significantly more sketchy after taking a closer look. At the most basic 
level, we often find it difficult to define what amounts to life. Is somebody whose heart 
has stopped beating dead? Is somebody whose brain has stopped working dead? Is 
somebody who is brain-dead and who has had his organs removed for transplantation 
dead? After all, the organs still need to function in order to be transplantable, so there 
must be something there, is this something life? Or to look beyond human life: is a 
virus “alive”? One could argue that this is not the case because it requires a host to 
survive and multiply. But certainly it is something different from a stone. Minerals, on 
the other hand, are not considered to be alive even though they can grow. On a higher 
level the question can be raised which rights or benefits should be given to animals. 
2 European Treaty Series, No. 5; hereinafter – “ECHR” or “the Convention”.
3 See, e.g. Kirchner, S. The Personal Scope of the Right to Life Under Article 2(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights After the Judgment in A, B and C v. Ireland. German Law Journal 2012, 
13(6): 783-792.
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To give one example, the Grundgesetz,4 the German constitution, is sometimes said to 
contain animal rights,5 a claim which is incorrect in several regards. To begin with, Art. 
20a of the Grundgesetz6 does not deal with human dignity (that clause is Art. 1 GG7), 
in addition, the norm requires that consideration is given to the environment as well as 
animals, but it does not grant subjective rights to animals8 (Common Law jurisdictions 
appear to me more ambiguous9). Even though, Art. 20a GG requires the state to enact 
laws that protect animals, such as the Animal Protection Law, the Tierschutzgesetz 
(TierSchG), the Law on the Protection of Animals.10 Other states have experienced 
similar debates and usually some kind of differentiation is made between different types 
of animals. The German law protects vertebrates more than other animals11 and gives 
special attention also to warm-blooded animals,12 while in some states sentient species 
such as dolphins and great apes are given a status aparte13 between other animals and 
humans. 
The unborn child after conception is genetically identical with the unborn child at 
twelve weeks of gestation, with the newly born child, the teenager or the adult. Any 
distinction between the “beginning of life”14 and the “beginning of personhood”15 is 
artificial. The Convention itself does not contain an explicit restriction of the concept 
of personhood to born humans. Persons within the meaning of the Convention are also 
4 Bundesgesetzblatt 1949, pp. 1 et seq.; hereinafter “GG”.
5 No author named – Germany votes for animal rights, in: CNN.Com, 17 May 2002, available online at 
<http://articles.cnn.com/2002-05-17/world/germany.animals_1_animal-rights-human-rights-lawma-
kers?_s=PM:WORLD> (last accessed on 9 November 2011).
6 art. 20a Grundgesetz.
7 Art 1 Grundgesetz.
8 H. d. jarass – Art. 20a, in: H. D. Jarass / B. Pieroth – Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
10th ed., Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich (2009), pp. 528 et seq., at p. 528.
9 Cf. e.g. Lubinski, J. Introduction to Animal Rights, 2nd ed., Michigan State University / Detroit College of 
Law, Detroit (2004), available online at <http://www.animallaw.info/ articles/art_details/print.htm> (last 
visited 15 November 2011), Chapter II, Part A.
10 Bundesgesetzblatt 2006, Vol. I, pp. 1206 et seq.  
11 E.g. in § 4(1) sentence 1 TierSchG: „Ein Wirbeltier darf nur unter Betäubung oder sonst, soweit nach den 
gegebenen Umständen zumutbar, nur unter Vermeidung von Schmerzen getötet werden“. (A vertebrate 
animal may only be killed under sedation or otherwise, in as far as reasonable given the concrete circums-
tances, only while avoiding pain.)   
12 § 4a TierSchG.
13 Originally describing one possible status of a dependent territory with relation to the mainland, in particu-
lar in the context of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the term status aparte is used here in the sense that 
sentient animals, because they are animals, are not a sui generis category between humans and animals 
but that they have a special status with regard to other animals which goes beyond the special treatment 
afforded e.g. to vertebrae or warm-blooded animals (cf. the last two footnotes).
14 Rey, A.-M. Coerced childbearing is tantamount to servitude – Comment on the judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights of 16 January 2010, 28 january 2011, available online at <http://www.europe-
anprochoice network.wordpress.com/2011/01/28/comment-abourt-abc-judgment-coerced-childbearing-
is-tantamount-to-servitude> (last accessed on 28 january 2011).
15 Ibid.
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legal persons, such as corporations.16 There is no basis in the Convention for the claim17 
that personhood, as far as natural persons are concerned, starts at a point later than 
conception. The language used in X v. The United Kingdom18 to the effect that “the 
general usage of the term ‘everyone’ [...] and the context in which the term is employed 
in Article 2 [ECHR] tend to support the view that it does not include the unborn”19 
leaves plenty of room for debate. The unborn child is undoubtedly a human being, 
even before being born. Should it become technically possible in the future to have 
not only the fertilisation but the entire pregnancy ex utero, this criterion will become 
fully useless. Therefore we need to have a better definition of what it means to be a 
human being. The same applies to the case of human-animal hybrids, which already 
exist today. 
As soon as humans are concerned in any way, we enter the realm of bioethics in the 
proper sense of the word. Therefore, if some human genes are implanted into an animal, 
it becomes an issue of bioethics.20 Many states on paper prohibit the creation of human-
animal hybrids or plan to do so,21 at least beyond a certain point in the development 
of the embryo,22 but the reality on the ground, in laboratories and hospitals, has been 
looking different for some time now: already more than five years ago, the Dutch 
company Pharming has created a human-cow hybrid,23 albeit in the form of a cow with 
just one human gene.24 It is the aim of this project to create milk which contains human 
16 Kirchner, S. Private Military and Security Corporations as Rights Holders under the European Convention 
on Human Rights?, on file with the author.
17 Rey, A.-M. Coerced childbearing is tantamount to servitude – Comment on the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 16 January 2010, 28 january 2011, available online at <http://
www.europeanprochoicenetwork.wordpress.com/2011/01/28/comment-abourt-abc-judgment-coerced-
childbearing-is-tantamount-to-servitude> (last accessed on 28 january 2011).
18 EComHR – X v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8416/78, Decision of 13 May 1980, in: 19 Decisions 
and Reports (1980), pp. 244 et seq.
19 Ibid., para. 9 / p. 7. Emphasis added.
20 Cf. Macdonald Glenn, L. Ethical Issues in Genetic Engineering and Transgenics (2004), available online 
at <http://www.actionbioscience.org/biotech/glenn.html> (last accessed on 31 October 2011). 
21 In the United States, the Human-Animal Hybrid Prohibition Act of 2009 has been referred to the 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 9 July 2009 but has not been dealt with since, cf. 
Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S. 1435, available online at <http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:S1435:> (last accessed on 31 October 2011); see also 111th Congress: 
Bills Considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee, available online at <http://www.judisiciary.state.
gov/legislation/111thCongress.cfm> (last accessed on 31 October 2011) and 112nd Congress: Bills 
Considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee, available online at <http://www.judisiciary.state.gov/
legislation/112ndCongress.cfm> (last accessed on 31 October 2011).  
22 DW staff (jen) – British Nod to Embryo ‘Chimeras’ Raises Hackles in Germany, in: DW-World.de, Deutsche 
Welle – Science, 21 May 2008, available online at <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3351368,00.
html> (last accessed on 8 November 2011).
23 No author named – A Dutch company looks to bring a protein created from transgenic cows to the 
American public. Is This Cow a Human-Animal Hybrid?, in: Seed Magazine, 12 April 2006, available 
online at <http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/is_this_cow_a_human-animal_hybrid> (last accessed 
on 31 October 2011).
24 Ibid.
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lactoferrin,25 a protein with many medical applications.26 Similar projects involve 
human genes in rice27 as well as in goats.28 While the idea of a human-ape brain hybrid 
seems to be the stuff of nightmares, such experiments have already been conducted in 
2001.29
Is an animal embryo that contains one specific human gene sequence, in the case 
of the transgenic cow the gene sequence that causes the human (and hence the cow’s) 
body to produce already human lactoferrin enough to claim that this animal is in fact no 
longer a cow but a human? This seems to be hardly the case, but the question already 
becomes harder if, for example, 10 % or 25 % percent of the genome of a hybrid are 
human. Where should we draw the line? Are only genetically pure humans also humans 
within the meaning of the law and therefore worthy of protection? This, too, cannot 
be the solution since it would deny the human nature of patients who have received 
donor organs from animals, for example heart valves from pigs. Is it sufficient to have 
a genome which is 50-plus-x % human? Or would that line be simply arbitrary? In case 
of doubt, if we cannot exclude that the creature in front of us is human, we have to 
protect it / him / her.30
2. Natural Law and the Right to Life
Even if one accepts the idea that ethics may not always be based on objective 
truths,31 law, as opposed to mere ethics, has to be objective because it applies to all 
members of a society. Law, also, has to be based on truth, otherwise it risks to be 
inherently unjust right from the start. While moral32 truths may be more controversial, 
neither law nor ethics can ignore scientific truths, such as contemporary knowledge 
about the prenatal development of the unborn child. When it comes to moral truths, 
25 Ibid.
26 See Ward, P. P., Paz, E. , Conneely, O. M. Multifunctional roles of lactoferrin: a critical overview, in: 62 
Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences (2005), pp. 2540 et seq., at pp. 2541 et seq.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ourednik, V., Ourednik, J., Flax, J. D. Zawada, M., Hutt, C., Yang, C., Park, K. I., Kim, S. U, Sidman, 
R. L., Freed, C. R., Snyder. E. Y. Segregation of Human Neural Stem Cells in the Developing Primate 
Forebrain, in: 293 Science (2001), pp. 1820 et seq., also published as Ourednik, V., Ourednik, J., Flax, 
J. D., Zawada, M., Hutt, C., Yang, C., Park, K. I., Kim, S. U, Sidman, R. L., Freed, C. R., Snyder. E. Y. 
Segregation of Human Neural Stem Cells in the Developing Primate Forebrain, in: Science Express, 
26 july 2001, pp. 1 et seq., available online at <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2001/07/26/
science.10b0580.full.pdf> (last accessed on 15 October 2011); Recer, P. Stem cells may help in brain 
repair, in: Gereontology Research Group – no title, 27 July 2001, available online at <http://www.grg.org/
StemCellMonkeyBrain.htm> (last accessed on 7 November 2011).
30 Cf. petre, j. Chimera embryos have right to life, say bishops, in: The Telegraph, 26 June 2007, available 
online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1555639/Chimera-embryos-have-right-to-life-say-
bishops.html> (last accessed on 31 October 2011). 
31 Cf. Palazzani, L. Introduzione alla biogiuridica, 1st ed., G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino (2002), p. 9
32 Palazzani, L., ibid., p. 11, seems to refer only to absolute moral-ethical standards in abstracto.
Stefan Kirchner. Natural Law as Biolaw28
though, it might appear as if there were no absolute truth due to today’s relativist and 
over-individualistic approach to ethics which lets everybody define ‘truth’ for him- 
or herself.33 In this sense, there is a strong tendency in today’s society to create our 
individual version of what we think is the truth. By doing so, we deprive ourselves of 
any external yardstick with which to determine whether what we think is the truth is 
actually so. At the same time, this perceived, self-made ‘truth’ is highly subjective. 
In fact, given that it is based on the notion of the freedom of the individual, it is as 
subjective as it can possibly be. Therefore, it is fundamentally inadequate for providing 
a basis on which to construct common rules. Because we cannot know for sure whether 
our personal ‘truth’ is really true, any rule based on it, would have to be manifestly 
unjust. Just as it is necessary to look for scientific truths and to take them into account 
when making or interpreting law, it is necessary to look for moral truths that are 
applicable to everyone.
From a Christian perspective, man should not meddle with creation by interfering 
with the procreative process34 and abortion is prohibited e.g. by the catholic church. 
Ironically enough, the Court, although its jurisprudence on abortion is clearly at odds 
with the teachings of many religions, in particular the Christian faith, elaborated at 
length on the history of the installation of a tour d’abandon or foundling wheel (the 
precursor to what today is referred to as a baby hatch) by St. Vincent de Paul and its 
impact on the development of the French legal system in contradiction to the principle 
mater semper certa est.35 
The basis for the prohibition of all forms of abortion in the Catholic faith is the 
Natural Law,36 which also greatly influenced the development of international law37. 
The idea of the existence of a Natural Law has featured prominently in Catholic legal 
and philosophical thought38 and continues to do so.39 Yet, not only is the idea of Natural 
Law under attack in this time of moral relativism and increasing secularity, it also 
needs to pass the test whether it makes good law. John Rawls is of the opinion that 
33 Cf. ibid.
34 rosenau, H., Reproduktives und therapeutisches Klonen, in: Amelung, K., Beulke, W., Lilie, H., Rosenau, 
H., Rüping, H., Wolfslast, G. (eds.) – Strafrecht – Biorecht – Rechtsphilosophie, Festschrift für Hans-
Ludwig Schreiber zum 70. Geburtstag am 10. Mai 2003, 1st ed., C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg (2003), 
pp. 761 et seq., at p. 765.
35 ectHr – Odièvre v. France, Application No. 42326/98, Judgment of 13 February 2003, para 15 et seq.
36 For an overview of the concept and its importance for Catholic bioethics see May, W. E. Catholic Bioethics 
and the Gift of Human Life, 2nd ed., Our Sunday Visitor publishing division, Huntington (2008), pp. 58 et 
seq.
37 Cf. Tietje, C. Internationalisiertes Verwaltungshandeln, 1st ed., Duncker & Humblot, Berlin (2001), p. 35.
38 See e.g. Catechism of the Catholic Church, available online at <http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_
INDEX.HTM> (last visited 23 November 2011), ##  1954 et seq.
39 Pope Benedict XVI – The Listening Heart, Reflections on the Foundations of Law, Address to the German 
Federal Parliament, 22 September 2011, available online at <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_
xvi/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-berlin_en.html> (last 
accessed on 2 November 2011), the original German text is available online at Pope Benedict XVI – 
Ansprache von Papst Benedikt XVI., 22 September 2011, available online at <http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/bene dict_xvi/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-
berlin_ge.html> (last accessed on 2 November 2011).
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no political good, regardless of its value, can be fully considered to be on par with 
potentially conflicting values which are rooted in moral, religion or philosophy.40 The 
reason for this seems to be the fundamental difference in nature between political goods 
(or interests, be they framed as rights or not) on one hand and what Rawls refers to as 
“transzendente Werte”41 (transcendental values42). If this were the case, the question 
behind this entire thesis would be mood since asking whether legal rules are compatible 
with a defined set of ethical rules would be akin to comparing pears with apples – and 
every pear, no matter its quality, will always fail at being an apple. Yet, Rawls errs in 
a crucial respect: he would be right, were there a multitude of “sources” for morals, 
philosophy, religion etc. and if political values would exist in a vacuum, untarnished, if 
you will, by those “transcendental” aspects. But both is not the case: if we keep in mind 
one premise on which this thesis is based, the assumption that there is indeed a Divine 
being who created all that exists and whom we refer to as God, we cannot exclude the 
idea of a Natural Law that has been set by the Creator and has been made accessible 
to His creatures, at least to us humans who know that we are capable of accessing this 
Natural Law through means of our conscience.43 
But what is Natural Law? Natural Law44 is not, unlike it is sometimes believed 
due to its importance for Christian (and in particular Catholic) legal philosophy, a 
divine law, i.e. a law set by God (as are for example the Ten Commandments), nor is 
it “vague religiosity”.45 It is also not identical to international law (although there are 
some overlaps) or the ius gentium of antiquity. While international law, of which the 
Convention is a part, arises out of the consent of the subject of the international legal 
order, Natural Law is based on the natural, inherent, connection which exists between 
all created beings, in this case, between all human beings. Because this connection is 
a consequence of the fact that humanity has been created – from the perspective of 
believers – by God. From a Christian perspective it is also God who is the ultimate 
reason for the existence of Natural Law.46 Yet, Natural Law also applies to non-believers. 
Therefore, it has to be independent of any specific faith, religion or world view and has 
to be accessible by everybody. The tools to understand the commands of the Natural 
Law are both reason and conscience. Although one might have the impression that the 
40 rawls, j. Der Vorrang des Rechten und die Ideen des Guten, in: van den Brink, B., van Reijen, W. (eds.) – 
Bürgergesellschaft, Recht und Demokratie, 1st ed., Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main (1995), pp. 153 
et seq., at p. 178
41 Ibid.
42 The text by Rawls was published in German, the term ‘transcendental values’ is my translation of the 
German term employed in the publication cited. 
43 Catechism of the Catholic Church, available online at <http://www.vatican.va /archive/ENG0015/_IN-
DEX.HTM> (last accessed on 23 November 2011), # 1956.
44 On the history of Natural Law thought see Malbon, j. Natural and Positive Law Influences on the Law 
Affecting Australia’s Indigenous People, in: 3 Australian Journal of Legal History (1997), pp. 1 et seq., at 
pp. 5 et seq.
45 Ibid., at p. 6.
46 On the connection between christian faith and the protection of the individual through international 
law see Eyffinger, A. Christianity and International Humanitarian Law, in: 15 Sri Lanka Journal of 
International Law (2003), pp. 29 et seq.
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idea of Natural Law had been abandoned even by catholic legal philosophers after the 
Second Vatican council,47 this view seems overly simplistic because the magisterium 
of the catholic church continues to refer to the Natural Law,48 which is also admitted 
by those who seem to doubt the Church’s dedication to the concept of Natural Law.49 
The universal values inherent in Natural Law have led to the emergence of international 
human rights law as well as to a closer look at human dignity, which was a fairly new 
legal concept at the time50 (of course, human dignity was nothing new – what was new 
was the idea that it could be put in legal terms). Natural Law applies to all humans qua 
human. Although there is the idea that this renaissance of Natural Law has failed,51 
even the technocratic approach52 prevalent in many domestic legal systems today has 
not led to the death of the concept of Natural Law: the label ‘Natural Law’ might not 
be popular anymore but the essence of it still exists in international, and in particular 
European, Human Rights Law.
Natural Law is law. After legal positivism has been largely discredited due to 
the crimes which were committed under its cover in the last century, we have moved 
beyond Carl Schmitt. But even if one works from the premise that there are rules of 
Natural Law which serve a more fundamental justice and with which positive laws can 
be at odds, legal positivism as such is not per se incompatible with the notion that there 
are higher, unwritten laws.53 Yet, in the case of laws which not only allow the killing 
of innocent children with impunity,54 but which even employ the notion of rights in the 
context of access to abortion, the conflict with the demands of justice becomes evident 
at the moment one accepts that the unborn child is a human being from the moment 
of conception. The recourse taken by the German Grundgesetz to the responsibility of 
the people towards God and man55 as well as to human dignity56 are examples of this 
move forward. But the post-positivist conception of law is not only inherently based on 
47 Römelt, J. Menschenwürde und Freiheit – Rechtsethik und Theologie des Rechts jenseits von Naturrecht 
und Positivismus, 1st ed., Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau (2006), p. 10.
48 Pope Benedict XVI – The Listening Heart, Reflections on the Foundations of Law, Address to the 
German Federal Parliament, 22 September 2011, available online at <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-berlin_en.html> 
(last accessed on 2 November 2011).
49 Römelt, J. Menschenwürde und Freiheit – Rechtsethik und Theologie des Rechts jenseits von Naturrecht 
und Positivismus, 1st ed., Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau (2006), p., p. 11.
50 Shaw, M. International Law, 4th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997), pp. 43 et seq.
51 Römelt, J. Menschenwürde und Freiheit – Rechtsethik und Theologie des Rechts jenseits von Naturrecht 
und Positivismus, 1st ed., Verlag Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau (2006), p. 19.
52 Somek, A. The Spirit of Legal Positivism, in: 12 German Law Journal (2011), pp. 729 et seq., at p. 729: 
“Legal Positivism is dead, isn’t it? We are all legal realists now. We believe, by default, that what really 
matters in law emerges from some judicial process.”
53 Munsonius, H. Kirchenrecht zwischen Positivismus und Bekenntnisbindung, in: 56 Zeitschrift für evange-
lisches Kirchenrecht (2011), pp. 279 et seq., at p. 290.
54 Cf. Araujo, R. J. Abortion – From Privacy to Equality: The Failure of the Justifications for Taking Human 
Life, in: 45 Houston Law Review (2008-2009), pp. 1737 et seq., at pp. 1747 et seq.
55 Grundgesetz, Preamble.
56 art. 1 (1) Grundgesetz, cf. also Menke, C., Pollmann, A. Philosophie der Menschenrechte – zur Einfüh-
rung, 1st ed., Junius Verlag, Hamburg (2007).
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ideas which themselves are rooted in Natural Law, post-positivist law shares a crucial 
characteristic with Natural Law: it is knowable. Post-positivist legal thought is centered 
on the idea that law is law in as much people, that is, those who are under the law, 
know that it exists.57 An international lawyer will immediately make the connection 
to a classic aspect of the sources of public international law, the requirement for state 
practice to be based on opinio juris in order to be able to contribute to the creation of 
customary international law. It is not enough for a state to act in a certain manner to 
create customary international law, the state has to act in this manner, and not otherwise, 
because it considers itself bound by this law. In the same way, natural law, the law 
which is pre-existent and essentially given by God, can be found, can be discovered by 
everyone through the use of our conscience. The Natural Law is “written on the heart”58 
of each and every human, regardless of religion, and which is therefore accessible, 
in other words, knowable, by all of use. When we follow our conscience, we do so 
because we have tapped into this knowledge of Natural Law, we know the law and act 
accordingly – because our conscience tells us to do so. But what then is the position of 
the Natural Law regarding abortion and euthanasia? That every being which is alive 
wants to be alive – a small animal running away from a predator, the natural shyness of 
animals, somebody who is sick and wounded fighting for his life, a mother caring for 
her baby despite material hardships – we all are, by our very nature as living beings, pro-
life. Life is generally perceived as something which is good. Concerning euthanasia, 
many who favour euthanasia do so on the basis of an understanding of the importance 
of a high quality of life which comes closer to Nazi ideologies of “life which is not 
worth living”59 than to christian views. Suffering is not bad per se, rather, it is a part 
of life, not an excuse to end life. While in the context of euthanasia, life is understood 
as only ‘counting as a life’ if it is a life free from pain, in the context of abortion the 
problem is in so far different as that the unborn child is yet too small to be visible from 
the outside. The mother does not feel her unborn son kick, her unborn daughter move 
in her womb etc. But the child is there and only because he or she is in the early stages 
of gestation it does not mean that the child is less human or less alive. The Natural Law 
position regarding abortion is the same as regarding euthanasia: we all have a right to 
life from conception to natural death. But is this really Natural Law in the sense that 
everybody can identify abortion as something that is wrong? Despite wishes by many 
pro-abortion advocates to the contrary, concerning abortion, there is still a sense that 
it is wrong in principle – why else would states feel the need to legislate on this issue, 
were it not for the unspoken knowledge that abortion was not right. If it were clearly 
and undoubtedly right, no state would have to legislate because everybody would know 
57 Forgó, N., Somek, A. Nachpositivistisches Rechtsdenken, in: Buckel, S., Christensen, R., Fischer-Lesca-
no, A. (eds.) – Neue Theorien des Rechts, 1st ed., Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart (2006), pp. 263 et seq., at 
p. 263.
58 johnson, p. e. The Law Written on the Heart – A Review of Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural 
Law by J. Budzizewski (InterVarsity press, 1997), available online at <http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/
jbudz.htm> (last accessed on 2 November 2011).
59 Cf. also Schmid-Tannwald, I. Gestern ‘lebensunwert’, heute ‘unzumutbar’, 2nd ed., Zuckerwerdt Verlag, 
Germering (2000), pp. 167 et seq.
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that it is ok to kill one’s child. rather, it is the case that abortion is wrong, yet for states, 
or at least many states, including the majority of those states which are parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Even those who use the label ‘pro-choice’ 
do not necessarily claim that abortion is right – rather they say that the woman should 
choose. Unless they are themselves in the position that they might have to make this 
choice, those pro-choice activists can pretend to have a clean conscience because the 
decision is to be made by the woman, because the burden is on the shoulders of the 
woman, who needs support rather than the burden of uncertainty and sin in addition to 
the challenges that already are ahead of her. all too often, those who advocate abortion 
later fail to support those women who are left behind traumatised after having had an 
abortion and it all too often falls to non-governmental projects intended to help those 
women.
But if everybody can access, see and understand the demands of the Natural Law, 
no value can be said to exist independently of this law. Therefore, philosophy, as well as 
religion, morals and even political convictions are the result of man’s struggle with this 
law in our hearts. They are different emanations of the same thing, regardless of how 
they are framed or labelled. We often may not understand it, we might misunderstand 
it, and obviously we often enough completely disregard it, but hardly anybody can 
claim not to have had a chance to reflect on the question whether something is right or 
wrong. This is not so much a question of competing ideals or values – I fully understand 
if somebody were to find my values wrong or even repulsive, the number of threats 
and insults I have received in the line of my pro-life advocacy work certainly indicates 
that many people in fact do so. Rather, it is about our ability as humans to be able in 
principle to draw the line between good and evil.60 Wanting to help a pregnant woman 
who does not know how to feed her child will normally be a good idea – executing this 
idea by suggesting that she have an abortion on the other hand is evil – even more so if 
the person suggesting so would have the material means to help the woman. 
But because many political values are inextricably connected to “transcendental”61 
values, to continue to use the term employed by Rawls, one can be measured against 
the other. Therefore, it is indeed possible – and scientifically legitimate – to ask 
whether a defined set of legal rules lives up to the standards imposed by a defined set 
of ‘transcendental’ rules – in our case, whether the right to life under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in particular regarding abortion, but also with regard 
to euthanasia, is compatible with the demands imposed by Catholic bioethics. This is 
not to say that rules of catholic bioethics were of a higher order in a hierarchical sense 
than the ecHr.62 To think so would lead to falling back to Rawls’ mistake that values 
would hardly matter.
60 Cf. already chapters 2 and 3 in Genesis.
61 Cf. Pope Benedict XVI – The Listening Heart, Reflections on the Foundations of Law, Address to the 
German Federal Parliament, 22 September 2011, available online at <http://www.vatican.va/holy_
father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110922_reichstag-berlin_
en.html> (last accessed on 2 November 2011).
62 Kirchner, S. Relative Normativity and the Constitutional Dimension of international law: A Place for 
Values in the International Legal System ?, in: 5 German Law Journal (2004), pp. 47 et seq., at p. 52.
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3. Application to the Interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights
applied63 to Art. 2 (1) ECHR, Natural Law’s concern for all human beings from 
the moment of conception requires us to interpret the personal scope of the norm 
to the effect that it also includes the unborn child,64 indeed all human beings from 
conception to death, although the definition of death is still as unclear as the definition 
of the beginning of human life has long been – and given the beginning debate on the 
permissibility of the brain death criterion for organ donations it seems fair to say that 
there will be need for debate on this issue as well.
What does the interpretation of the personal scope of art. 2 (1) ecHr presented 
here mean for current issues, such as in-vitro-fertilisation and pre-implantation 
diagnostics? The same that it means for abortion: the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
important and does not need to be abandoned per se. But when it comes to the question 
of what human life is, states must not be given a margin of appreciation. Rather, the 
concept should be replaced in those cases by an autonomous concept of the definition 
of human life which needs to be based on the best available medical and scientific 
knowledge. In political discourse, at times scientific knowledge is ignored. The notion 
that the embryo is just a collection of cells and not yet human is a leftover of the idea 
of the biogenetic principle, according to which it was thought that every human child 
in the womb repeats the evolution of the entire species, hence that we start as a kind 
of small fish and only later develop into a child. This idea was discredited already 
almost half a century ago,65 yet it seems to persist in the minds of many. This ignorance 
of scientific knowledge must not spill over into legal discourses. If law is to remain 
relevant, it has to be rooted in reality and while law sometimes can be considered a 
tool to change reality, this is not the case when it comes to simple biological facts. As 
long as states are unwilling to adapt their domestic laws to the biological reality of the 
continuous development of the unborn child and of the fully human identity of the old, 
sick, elderly and handicapped, the Court is called to take action. At the same time, and 
this is the other side of the medal, will states be free to act in this manner as long as the 
Court grants the states which are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights 
the wide margin of appreciation which they currently enjoy.
63 On the consequences of failing to take Natural Law considerations into account see e.g. Malbon, J. Natural 
and Positive Law Influences on the Law Affecting Australia’s Indigenous People, in: 3 Australian Journal 
of Legal History (1997), pp. 1 et seq., at p. 2.
64 See also Kirchner, S. The Personal Scope of the Right to Life Under Article 2(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights After the Judgment in A, B and C v. Ireland, in: 13 German Law Journal 
(2012) forthcoming; Kirchner, S. Abortion and the Right to Life under Art. 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, in: 9 IUP Journal of Environment and Health Care Law (2010), Nos. 1 & 2, Jan. and 
apr. 2010, pp. 10 et seq.
65 Blechschmidt, E. Wie beginnt das menschliche Leben?. Vom Ei zum Embryo, now available in the 8th 
ed., Christiania-Verlag, Stein am Rhein (2008); see also the interview which the late Prof. Dr. Erich 
Blechschmidt gave to PUR Magazin, available online at <http://www.aktion-leben.de/Abtreibung/
Embryonal-Entwicklung/sld01.html> (last accessed on 8 November 2011).
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It would not only be wise were the Court to abandon the margin of appreciation in 
the context of the right to life in favour of an autonomous concept – the Court is even 
obliged to do so: ignoring scientifically proven reality to avoid unpleasant obligations 
by recourse to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is simply abus de droit, 
which is prohibited by general principles of law66 which are part and parcel of public 
International Law by virtue of article 38 (1) lit. c of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice and which therefore in turn have to be taken into account by the Court 
because, even though the ECHR is a self-contained regime, it is still part of Public 
International Law as a whole. 
Moreover does the application of a margin of appreciation to the right to life run 
counter to the spirit and aim of the Convention, which is the most effective protection of 
human rights, what already follows from the full title of the Convention, the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? Article 31 (1) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,67 which in this respect only codifies 
the existing customary law,68 requires the term “everyone” in Art. 2 (1) ECHR to be 
interpreted not only in the ordinary meaning of the word – which might leave some 
room for doubts – but also “in good faith”69 as well as “in the light of [the Convention’s] 
object and its purpose”.70 The purpose of the Convention is the protection of human 
rights against abuses, which requires a human rights-friendly interpretation of the 
convention and therefore a wide interpretation of the personal scope of article 2 (1) 
ECHR. Such a general human rights-friendly approach in interpreting the applicability 
of a norm does also not burden the states too much because it does not limit their ability 
to place limitations on said rights as far as the Convention allows them to do so. Also, 
the effective protection of human rights makes it necessary to ensure that the core of 
human rights is protected in any case and there is no human right more fundamental 
than the right to life. The scope ratione personae of the most fundamental of all human 
rights certainly is the wrong place for states to claim a more narrow interpretation of 
the convention.
Conclusions
As long as the risk of abortion hangs over a human life, as long as the European 
Court of Human Rights remains committed to granting states great freedoms in applying 
the convention and as long as even a single state party to the convention has not enacted 
66 Byers, M. Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, in: 47 McGill Law Journal / Revue de 
droit de McGill (2002), pp. 389 et seq., at p. 397, available online at <http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/
documents/47.2.Byers.pdf> (last accessed on 4 November 2011).
67 11 United Nations Treaty Series 331, hereinafter “VCLT”.
68 Cf. in general Schrever, c. Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 
7 February 2006, available online at <http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_85.pdf> (last accessed 
on 4 November 2011).
69 Art. 31 (1) VCLT.
70 Ibid.
Jurisprudence. 2013, 20(1): 23–39. 35
domestic legislation aimed at protecting the right to life under all circumstances, the 
way we make use of the European Human Rights system is flawed. The system itself 
can work and can become a valuable tool for the right to life movement. The current 
application of European Human Rights law, though, is incompatible with Catholic 
bioethics. The main reasons for this are a lack of courage on the part of both the Court 
and the states parties as well as a disconnection between those in power and the catholic 
faith. Therefore, from a religious perspective, in the long run, the new evangelisation 
of Europe will be necessary first in order to create the religious conditions necessary 
to change the legal protection of the right to life which we all require since they day 
we were conceived. From a legal or rational perspective, the arguments presented here 
might provide a first step towards a complete end to all abortions and a fuller protection 
of every human life.
Natural law concepts can be made useful in terms of biolaw not only on the abstract 
but also on a very concrete level in as much natural law requires due consideration to be 
given to every human being, regardless of age, health or status.
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PRIGIMTINĖ TEISĖ KAIP BIOTEISĖ
Stefan Kirchner
Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Bioteisė yra susijusi su žmogaus asmens teisėmis medicinos bei mokslinių 
tyrimų srityje. Egzistuoja ryšiai tarp bioteisės ir kitų teisės šakų, ypač – ryšiai su žmogaus 
teisėmis. Kartu pastebima vis dažniau aktyviai aptarinėjama abejotino adekvatumo teisinė 
reakcija į daugumą naujų technologijų. Kalbant apie žmogaus teises ir visų pirma – teisę į 
gyvybę, susitarimas neturėtų būti tinkamo interpretavimo sąlyga. 
Negimęs vaikas iš karto po apvaisinimo yra genetiškai identiškas negimusiam arba bet 
kuriuo vėlesniu metu gimusiam vaikui. Teisė privalo būti grindžiama tiesa, nes priešingu 
atveju ji rizikuoja tapti iš prigimties neteisinga nuo pat pradžių. Nors moralinės tiesos 
gali būti labiau prieštaringos, jokia teisėkūra negali ignoruoti mokslinės tiesos, pavyzdžiui, 
šiuolaikinių žinių apie negimusio vaiko vystymąsi nėštumo laikotarpiu.
Šiandieninio mokslo žinios apie gyvenimą įsčiose palaiko seniai egzistuojančią 
prigimtinės teisės nuostatą dėl negimusio vaiko teisės į gyvybę. Be to, faktas, kad abortas nėra 
teisė, yra žinomas bent jau tam tikru lygiu (kitu atveju nebūtų poreikio teisės aktuose numa-
tyti baudžiamąją atsakomybę už abortų darymą). 
Klabant apie teisės į gyvybę taikymą asmenų atžvilgiu pagal EŽTK 2 (1) straipsnį, 
požiūris, kad prigimtinė teisė rūpinasi visais žmonėmis nuo apvaisinimo momento, reikalau-
ja besąlygiško pripažinimo, jog minėtoji norma galioja ir negimusio vaiko atžvilgiu, nes iš 
tikrųjų žmogaus egzistavimas prasideda nuo apvaisinimo, o baigiasi mirtimi. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: prigimtinė teisė, Europos žmogaus teisių konvencija, vertybės, 
tarptautinė teisė, bioetika, moralė, biotechnologijos, teisė į gyvybę, abortas, apvaisinimas in 
vitro, krikščionybė, katalikybė, Vokietija, Nyderlandai.
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